Some of the econ stuff I've been reading lately has been about the relationship between your present self and your future self. You can look at time preference (aka the interest rate, aka ipod today versus rent next month, aka cigarette today versus not having lung cancer in twenty years) as a negotiation between your present self and your future self.
Except it's not much of a negotiation, really, because your present self has all the power. The only leverage your future self has is the warning that "you know, someday you're going to be me."
There's something called the time consistency problem, which I posted about here. In a nutshell, my present self wants to do something later, but everyone knows that my future self won't want to do it when the time comes. You solve the problem with a commitment strategy. Your present self today does something that binds your future self to the course of action your present self desires.
That raises the question of "future self paternalism". Some of us object when the government (or our moms) say "wear your seatbelt - we know what's best for you." But if you use a commitment to bind your future self to an action that you suspect your future self wouldn't otherwise do, you're saying the same thing to your future self. "Stay married, even if you don't want to - I know what's best for you." A natural question arises: what makes you think that your present self is any better at making decisions than your future self?
My view is that part of your present self's job is to make decisions on behalf of your future self. Your present self determines what your future self will be. Your future self can be a doctor or a street mime depending on what your present self chooses... but your future self can't make that choice.
More interestingly, not only does your future self not get a vote, but your present choices can even affect what your future self's vote would be! If you choose to be a doctor, you'll probably later be happy you chose to be a doctor. If you choose to be a street mime, you'll probably be happy you chose to be a street mime.
I see it as similar to raising a child. Yes, it's another person, but you get to make a lot of decisions about what that other person is going to be like. If we had brain uploading, I would still be myself and my uploaded brain-sim would be someone else who just happened to be a lot like me - and the only reason I'd have for doing that is more-or-less the same reason I'd have for creating a child (with fewer poopy diapers). The difference is that there is a sense of continuity between my present self and future self, or at least there will be over time. Between myself and my child, or myself and my brain-clone, there's a discontinuity, so they will forever be someone else and I will forever stay myself.
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timeasmymeasure
Re: "most comment-generating post evar" award
Date: 2007-07-10 03:34 pm (UTC)Except it's not much of a negotiation, really, because your present self has all the power. The only leverage your future self has is the warning that "you know, someday you're going to be me."
There's something called the time consistency problem, which I posted about here. In a nutshell, my present self wants to do something later, but everyone knows that my future self won't want to do it when the time comes. You solve the problem with a commitment strategy. Your present self today does something that binds your future self to the course of action your present self desires.
That raises the question of "future self paternalism". Some of us object when the government (or our moms) say "wear your seatbelt - we know what's best for you." But if you use a commitment to bind your future self to an action that you suspect your future self wouldn't otherwise do, you're saying the same thing to your future self. "Stay married, even if you don't want to - I know what's best for you." A natural question arises: what makes you think that your present self is any better at making decisions than your future self?
My view is that part of your present self's job is to make decisions on behalf of your future self. Your present self determines what your future self will be. Your future self can be a doctor or a street mime depending on what your present self chooses... but your future self can't make that choice.
More interestingly, not only does your future self not get a vote, but your present choices can even affect what your future self's vote would be! If you choose to be a doctor, you'll probably later be happy you chose to be a doctor. If you choose to be a street mime, you'll probably be happy you chose to be a street mime.
I see it as similar to raising a child. Yes, it's another person, but you get to make a lot of decisions about what that other person is going to be like. If we had brain uploading, I would still be myself and my uploaded brain-sim would be someone else who just happened to be a lot like me - and the only reason I'd have for doing that is more-or-less the same reason I'd have for creating a child (with fewer poopy diapers). The difference is that there is a sense of continuity between my present self and future self, or at least there will be over time. Between myself and my child, or myself and my brain-clone, there's a discontinuity, so they will forever be someone else and I will forever stay myself.